# United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit



**APPENDIX** 

#### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

-against-

CLIFFORD ZIEGLER, Defendant-Appellant.

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York

#### **APPENDIX**

WILLIAM J. STUTMAN Attorney for Defendant-**Appellant** 233 Spring Street New York, N. Y. 10013 255-5170

DAVID G. TRAGER UNITED STATES ATTORNEY For The Eastern District Of New York Attorney For Appellee 225 Cadman Plaza East Brooklyn, New York 11201



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### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

E.D.N.Y. 74 CR. 467

-against-

PLATT, J.

CLIFFORD ZEIGLER.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA


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
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7-2-74	Before PLATT,	Indict	ment fi	led	1 1 Fren	oution of	same st
7/12/74	Before PLATT, J Indictment filed  Before Platt, JCase called-Bench warrant ordered-Execution of same stay						
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7-16-74	Before Platt -	Bench Wa	rrant or	rdered.			
7-18-74	nearly warment issued						
11-1-74	Before DOOLING J - case called - deft produced in court on a Bench Warrant - deft to appear on Nov. 4, 1974 before Judge Platt at						
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ATE	PROCKED:NGS
10.71	Before PLATT, J - case called - deft present with counsel M.Seltzer
-18-74	of Legal Aid - adjd to Nov. 26, 1974 at 9:30 am fo set a date for trial.
/26/74	Before PLATT, J Case called- Deft and counsel present- Adjd to 1/3/75 at
	A.M.
/3/75	Before PLATT, J Case called- Adjd to 2/28/75
/18/75	Magistrate's file 74 M 165 inserted into CR file.
2-24-75	Before PLATT, J - case called - deft & counsel present - adjd to 2-25-75
	at 2:00 PM
2/25/75	Before PLATT, J Case called- Deft and counsal Present- Case ready and
1237.5	holding pending assignment of counsel
4/11/75	By PLATE I - Order appointing counsel filed (ZEIGLER)
7	Passer DIATT I - case called - adid to 4-21-75 at 9:30 am.
2/2/75	Before PLATT, J Case called- deft and counsel present- case adjd to 12/8
	0.20 A W
12-8-75	Refore PLATT, J - case called - deft & atty Hesper Jackson
	Trial ordered and begun - Trial contd to 12-9-7
12-9-75	Before PLATT, J - case called - deft & counsel H.Jackson plasent -
	tried contd's defts motion to dismiss denied - defts motion for a
	mistrial denied - Jury retires to deliberate - Jury returns with a
	wardict of guilty as to counts 1 and 2 - jury polled and discharged -
	to set aside the verdict is denied - bail set at \$10,000
	PRR -sentence adid without date - trial concluded.
12-9-75	Notice of Appearance filed.
12/31/7	E Woushar for omnensation of coursel filed
1-8-76	Stenographers transcript dated bec. 0, 1975 1220
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P	to the special parole term of o years, pursuant to 10.420
	to run concurrently with sentence in count 1.
1-9-76	Judgment and Commitment filed - certified copies to Marshal.
113-76	- Filed (no fee)
1-1376	The Lasto of Notice of Appeal malled to the Court
	of Appeals.
1/20/76	Copy of order received from court of appeals that record be docketed on
1/30/76	
2-4-76	Record on Appeal certified and handed to J.Gil for delivery to the
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DATE	PROCEEDINGS					
2-6-76	Acknowledgment received from the Court of Appeals for Record on Appeal filed.					
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Cr. No. -against-(T. 21, U.S.C., §841(a)(1); T. 18, U.S.C., §2) CLIFFORD ZEIGLER, Defendant. U. S. DISTRICT COURT E.D. N.Y. THE GRAND JURY CHARGES: 1974 JUL 2 COUNT ONE TIME AM ..... On or about the 5th day of October, 1973, within the Eastern District of New York, the defendant CLIFFORD ZEIGLER, did knowingly and intentionally possess with intent to distribute, approximately 47.17 grams of heroin hydrochloride, a Schedule I narcotic drug con rolled substance. (Title 21, United States Code, §841(a)(1); Title 18, United States Code, §2). COUNT TWO On or about the 5th day of October, 1973, within the Eastern District of New York, the defendant CLIFFORD ZEIGHER, did knowingly and intentionally distribute approximately 47.17 grams of heroin hydrochloride, a Schedule I narcotic drug controlled substance. (Title 21, United States Code, \$841(a)(1); Title 18, United States Code, §2). A TRUE BILL. United States Attorney Eastern District of New York

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AFTERNOON SESSION

(Time noted: 2:05 p.m.)

THE COURT: Bring in the jury.

(Jury enters jury box.)

THE COURT: We have to wait just one moment, ladies and gentlemen. I'll give him one more moment. If he doesn't arrive shortly, we will proceed.

(Mr. Corcoran and Mr. Jackson not present.)

THE COURT: Mr. Passalaqua, do you have any objection to proceeding without the government being present.

MR. PASSALAQUA: I have no objection.

gentlemen, I do make it a practice of reading my charge to you rather than giving it to you extemporaneously, for two reasons. One, I think while it's harder for you to listen to than to hear an extemporaneous charge, it's much more accurate if it is read. Secondly, it minimizes the risk of error and the possibility of having to retry the case.

So, I ask you to bear with me and listen to the charge carefully. It requires a little bit more attention on your part. But I am sure you are capable of doing that.

Now that you have heard the evidence and the

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argument, it becomes my duty to give the instructions of the Court as to the law applicable to this case.

It is your duty as jurors to follow the law as stated in the instructions of the Court, and to apply the rules of law so given to the facts as you find them from the evidence in the case.

You are not to single out one instruction alone as stating the law, but must consider the instructions as a whole.

Neither are you to be concerned with the wisdom of any rule of law stated by the Court. Regardless of any opinion you may have as to what the law ought to be, it would be a violation of your sworn duty to base a verdict upon any other view of the law than that given in the instruction of the Court; just as it would be a violation of your sworn duty, as judges of the facts, to base a verdict upon anything but the evidence in the case.

You must not permit yourselves to be governed by sympathy, bias, prejudice or any other considerations not founded on evidence and these instructions on the law.

Justice through trial by jury must always depend upon the willingness of each individual juror

to seek the truth as to the facts from the same evidence presented to all the jurors; and to arrive at a verdict by applying the same rules of law as given in the instructions of the Court.

You have been chosen and sworn as jurors in this case to try the issues of fact presented by the allegations of the indictment and the denial made by the "Not guilty" plea of the accused.

You are to perform this duty without bias or prejudice as to any party. The law does not permit jurors to be governed by sympathy, prejudice or public opinion. Both the accused and the public expect that you will carefully and impartially consider all the evidence in the case, follow the law as stated by the Court and reach a just verdict, regardless of the consequences.

I am not sending the exhibits which have been received in evidence with you as you retire for your deliberations. You are entitled, however, to see any or all of the exhibits as you consider your verdict. I suggest that you begin your deliberations and then, if it would be helpful to you, you may ask for any or all of the exhibits simply by sending a note to me through one of the marshals who will be stationed

outside your door.

Now an indictment is but a form or method of accusing a defendant of a crime. It is not evidence of any kind against the accused.

There are two types of evidence from which a jury may properly find a defendant guilty of a crime. One is direct evidence, such as the testimony of an eye witness. The other is circumstantial evidence, the proof of facts and circumstances which rationally imply the existence or non-existence of other fact; because such other facts usually follow according to the common experience of mankind.

(Continued next page.)

rs/ss

THE COURT: (Continuing.) By way of example, the footprint of a man in the sand implied to Robinson Carusoe there was another man with him on the desert island and indeed there was, the man Friday. Thus on the one hand you may have direct evidence of the issue and on the other hand you may have circumstantial evidence of the issue. The law does not hold that one type of evidence is necessarily of better quality than the other. The law requires only that the government prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt both on the direct and circumstantial evidence. At times the jury might feel that circumstantial evidence is of better quality. At other times they may feel direct evidence is of better quality. That judgment is left entirely up to you.

As a general rule, the law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence, but simply requires that, before convicting a defendant, the jury be satisfied of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt from all the evidence in the case.

The law presumes the defendant to be innocent of crime. Thus a defendant, although accused, begins the trial with a clean slate, with no evidence against him. And the law permits nothing but legal evidence

of any charge against the accused. So the presumption of innocence alone is sufficient to acquit a defendant until the jurors are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt after careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence in the case.

The burden is always upon the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This burden never shift to a defendant; for the law never imposes upon a defendant in a criminal case the burden or duty of calling any witnesses or producing any evidence.

A reasonable doubt does not mean a doubt arbitrarily and capriciously asserted by a juror because of his or her reluctance to perform an unpleasant task. It does not mean a doubt arising from the natural sympathy which we all have for others, It is not necessary for the government to prove the guilt of the defendant beyond all possible doubt.

Because if that were the rule, very few people would ever be convicted. It is practically impossible for a person to be absolutely sure and convinced of any controverted facts which, by its nature, is not susceptible of mathematical certainty. In consequence, the law says that a doubt should be a reasonable doubt,

not a possible doubt.

A reasonable doubt is a doubt based upon reason and common sense, the kind of doubt that would make a reasonable person hesitate to act. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt must therefore be proof of such a convincing character that you would be willing to rely and act upon it unhesitatingly in the most important of your affairs.

The jury will remember that the defendant is not to be convicted on mere suspicion or conjecture.

Again, a reasonable doubt means a doubt that is based on reason and must be substantial rather than speculative. It should be sufficient to make a prudent person hesitate to act in the most important of his or her life.

The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt operates on the whole case and not on the separate bits of evidence. Each individual item of evidence need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Now it is charged in Count One of the indictment that on or about the 5th day of October, 1973, within the Eastern District of New York, the defendant Clifford Zeigler knowingly and intentionally possessed with intent to distribute approximately

47.17 grams of heroin hydrochloride, a Schedule I narcotic controlled substance in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Section 841 and in Tilte 18, United States Code, Section 2.

The statues alleged to have been violated in both Counts One and Two of the indictment, in this case they are disignated as Section 841 (a) (1) of Title 21 and Section 2 of Title 18. The first of these sections provides in pertinent part: "It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to distribute or possess with intent to distribute, a controlled substance." Schedule I includes heroin.

Both counts of the indictment charge a violation of the so-called aiding and abetting section, Title 18, United States Code Subsection 2, which provides that:

"Whoever commits an offense against the
United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands,
induces or procures its commission, is punishable as
a principal."

And, "Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal."

Now the essential elements of the charge in Count One, which must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt are:

One, the act of possessing heroin as alleged;

Two, that the defendant knowingly and

intentionally possessed the same; and

Three, that the defendant possessed the same with intent to distribute it as alleged

"That on or about the 5th day of October, 1973, within the Eastern District of New York, the defendant Clifford Zeigler did knowingly and intentionally distribute approximately 47.17 grams of heroin hydrochloride, a Schedule I narcotic, in violation of..." the same two sections which I just read to you.

The essential elements of the crime charged which must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt are: The act of distributing heroin as alleged; that any such distribution by the defendant was done knowingly and intentionally.

Now on the question of possession. The law recognizes two kinds of possession. Actual possession and constructive possession. A person who knowingly has direct physical control over a thing, at a given

time, is then in actual possession of it.

A person who, although not in actual possession knowingly has both power and the intention, at a given time, to exercise dominion or control over a thing, either directly or through another person or persons, is then in constructive possession of it.

The law recognizes also that possession may be sole or joint. If a person alone has actual or constructive possession of a thing, possession is sole. If two or more persons share actual or constructive possession of a thing, possession is joint.

You may find the element of possession as that term is used in these instructions is present if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the efendant had actual or constructive possession, either alone or jointly with others.

An act or failure to act is knowingly done, if done voluntarily and intentionally, and not because of mistake or accident or other innocent reason.

Now as I indicated to you, I read to you a moment ago and I read Section 2 of Title 18 of the United States Code provides that, "Whoever commits an offense against the United States, or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, or procures its

commission, is punishable as a principal. Whoever willfully causes an act to be done, which if directly performed by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal."

The guilt of a defendant may be established without proof that the accused personally did every act constituting the offense charged.

In other words, every person who willfully participates in the commission of a crime may be found guilty of that of ense. Participation is willful if done voluntarily and intentionally, and with a specific intent to do something the law forbids or with a specific intent to fail to do something the law requires to be done: That is to say, with bad purpose either to disobey or to disregard the law.

In order to aid and abet another to commit a crime it is necessary that the accused willfully associate himself in some way with the criminal venture, and willfully participate in it as he would in something he wishes to bring about; that is to say, that he willfully seek by some act or omission of his to make the criminal venture succeed.

An act or omission is willfully done if done

voluntarily and intentionally and with the specific intent to do something the law forbids or with the specific intent to fail to do something the law requires to be done; that is to say, with bad purpose either to disobey or to disregard the law.

You of course may not find any defendant guilty unless you find beyond a reasonable doubt that every element of the offense as defined in these instructions was committed by some person or persons and that the defendant participated in its commission.

Mere presence at the scene of the crime and knowledge that a crime is being committed are not sufficient to establish that the defendant aided and abetted the crime, unless you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was a participant an not merely a knowing spectator.

The weight of the evidence is not necessarily determined by the number of vitnesses testifying on either side. You should consider all the facts and circumstances in evidence to determine which of the witnesses are worthy of greater credence. I will give you more instructions on that question in a moment.

An act is done knowingly if done voluntarily and intentionally and not because of mistake or

accident or other innocent reason.

The purpose in adding the word knowingly was to insure that no one would be convicted for an act done because of mistake or accident or other innocent reason.

As stated before, with respect to an offense such as charged in this case, specific intent must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt before there can be a conviction.

An act is done willfully if done voluntarily and intentionally, and with the specific intent to do something the law forbids: That is to say with bad purpose either to disobey or disregard the law.

Now knowledge and intent ordinarily may not be proven directly, because there is no way of fathoming or scrutinizing the operations of the human mind.

But you may infer a defendant's knowledge and intent from the surrounding circumstances. You may consider any statement made and done or omitted by a defendant, and all of the facts and circumstances in evidence which indicate his state of mind. It is ordinarily reasonable to infer that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of his acts knowingly done or knowingly omitted.

evidence in the case, unless made as an admission or stipulation of fact. When the attorneys for both sides stipulate or agree to the existence of a fact, such as in this case I think they agreed on the fact that the package, Exhibit Number 2, contains 47.17 grams of herein, you must until otherwise instructed accept such stipulation as evidence and regard that fact as proved.

The Court may take judicial notice of certain facts or events. I don't believe I did in this case. Unless you are otherwise instructed, the evidence in the case always consists of the sworn testimony of the witnesses, regardless or who may have called them, and all exhibits received in evidence, regardless of who may have produced them and all facts which may have been admitted or stipulated and all applicable presumptions stated in these instructions.

Any evidence as to which an objection was sustained by the Court and any evidence ordered stricken by the Court must be entirely disregarded. Evidence does include however what was brought out from a witness on cross-examination as well as what he testified to on direct examination. Unless you were

otherwise instructed anything you may have seen or heard outside the Courtroom is not evidence and must be entirely disregarded.

You are to consider only the evidence in the case and your verdict is to be based upon the evidence only. But, in your consideration of the evidence you are not limited to the bald statements of the witnesses. In other words, you're not limited solely to what you see and hear as the witness testifies. You are permitted to draw from facts which you find has been proven, such reasonable inferences that you feel are justified in the light of your experience, inferences are deductions or conclusions which reason and common sense lead the jury to draw from the facts which have been shown by the evidence in the case.

If a lawyer asks a witness westion which contains an assertion of fact you may not consider the assertion as evidence of that fact. The lawyer's statements are not evidence. Evidence relating to any statement or act or comission claimed to have been made or done by a defendant outside of Court and after a crime has been committed should always be considered with caution and weighed carefully. All such evidence should be disregarded entirely? The evidence in the

that the statement or act or omission was knowingly made or done. A statement or act or omission is knowingly made or done voluntarily and intentionally and not because of mistake or accident or other innocent reason.

In determining whether any statement or act or omission claimed to have been made by defendant outside of Court and after a crime has been committed was knowingly made or done, the jury should consider the age, six, training, education, occupation, physical and intal condition of the defendant. Also all the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement, of the act or admission.

You as jurors are the sole judges of the credibility of witnesses and the weight their testimony is to be given. You should scrutinize all the testimony, given, the circumstances under which each witness has testified and every matter in evidence which tends to show whether the witnesses were worthy of belief. Consider each witness' intelligence, motive and state of mind and the demeanor and manner while on the stand. Consider the witness' ability to observe the matters as to which he has

testified and whether he impresses you as having an accurate recollection of these matters.

Consider also any relation each witness may
bear to either side of the case; the manner in which
each witness may be affected by the verdict, if to any
extent at all, and if each witness is supported or
contradicted by other evidence in the case.

Inconsistencies or discrepancies in the testimony of a witness or between the testimony of different witness, may or may not cause a juror to discredit such testimony. If two or more persons observe an incident or transaction, they may see or hear it differently.

And innocent failure of recollection is not an uncommon experience. In weighing the effect of a discrepancy, always consider whether it pertains to matters of importance or unimportant details and whether the discrepancy results form innocent error or interntional falsehood.

After making your own judgment, you will give the testimony of each witness such credibility, if any, as you may think it deserves.

The testimony of a witness may be discredited or impeached by showing that he previously made statements

which are inconsistent with the present testimony ...

The contradicted testimony or the impeaching of the credibility of a witness does not establish the truth of these statements. It is the province of the jury to determine the credibility, if any, to be given to the testimony of any witness who has been impeached.

If a witness has been shown to have knowingly testified falsely concerning any material matter or particular matter, you may reject all the testimony of that witness or give it such credibility as you may think it deserves.

The law does not compel a defendant in a criminal case to take the witness stand and testify and no presumption of guilt may be raised and no inference of any kind may be drawn from the failure of a defendant to testify. As stated before, the law never imposes upon a defendant in a criminal case the burden or duty of calling any witness or producing any evidence.

It is the duty of the attorney on each side of the case to object when the other side offers testimony or other evidence which the attorney believes is not properly admissible.

You should not be prejudiced against an attorney or his client because the attorney has made objections. Upon allowing the testimony or other evidence to be introduced over an objection of an attorney, the Court does not, unless expressly stated, indicate any opinion as to the weight or effect of such evidence.

As stated before the jurors are the sole judges of the credibility of all witnesses and the weight and effect of all evidence.

when the Court has sustained an objection to a question directed to a witness, the jury must disregard the entire question and may draw no inferences from the wording or speculate as to what the itness would have said if he were permitted to answer the ruestion.

The fact that the Court has asked one or more questions of a witness for clarity or admissibility is not to be taken by you as an indication the Court has any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant in the case and you are to draw no such inferences therefrom.

That determination is up to you and to you alone, based on all the facts of this case and the applicable law in these instructions.

Now you are here to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused from the evidence in the case. You are not called upon to return a verdict as to the guilt or innocence of any other person or persons, i. So, if the evidence in the case convinces you beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused, you should so find. But if any reasonable doubt remains in your mind after a careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence in the case, it is your duty to find the accused not guilty.

The verdict must represent the considered

judgment of each juror. In order to return a verdict

it is necessary that each juror agree thereto. Your

verdict must be unanimous. It is your duty as jurors

to consult with one another and to deliberate with a

view to reaching an agreement, if you can do so without

violence to an individual's judgment.

Each of you must decide the case for himself or herself but do so only after an impartial consideration of the evidence in the case with your fellow jurors.

In the course of your deliberations do not hesitate to re-examine your own views and change your opinion if conviced it is erroneous. But do not surrender your honest conviction or the weight of effect

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the evidence solely because of opinion of your fellow jurors or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict. Remember at all times you are not partisans. You are judges of the facts. Your sole interest is to seek the truth from the evidence in the case. There is nothing peculiarly different in the way a juror should consider the evidence in a criminal case in that which all reasonable persons treat any question, depending upon evidence presented to them. You're expected to use your good common sense, consider the evidence in the case for only those purposes which it has been admitted and give it a reasonable and fair construction in the light of your own common knowledge tendencies and inclinations. If you believe the accused proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, say so. If not so proved guilty, say so.

You must render a verdict with respect to each of the two counts of the indictment that I have described to you. If any reference either by the Court or by counsel to the matter does not coincide with your own recollection, it is your recollection that should control your deliberations.

The punishment provided by the law for the offense charged in the indictment is a matter

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exclusively within the province of the Court and should never be considered by the jury in any way in arriving at an impartial verdict as to the guilt or innocence of the accused.

Upon retiring to the jury room the juror closest to me, Juror Number 1, will act as your foreman unless he declines to do so. If he declines, then you will elect a foreman or forelady from amongst your number. The foreman will preside over your deliberations and will be your spokesman here in Court.

If it becomes necessary during your deliberations to communicate with the ourt, you may send a note by the deputy marshal, signed by your foreman or by one or more members of the jury. No member of the jury should ever attempt to communicate with the Court by any other means other than a signed writing. The Court will never communicate with any member of the jury on any subject touching the merits of the case otherwise and in writing or orally here in open Court.

You will note from the oath that shall be taken by the deputy marshals that they too as well as all other persons are forbidden to communicate in any way or any manner with any member of the jury on any subject touching the merits of the case.

mind also, and this is very important. That you are never to reveal to any person, not even to the Court, that is me or any other member attached to the Court how the jury stands numerically or otherwise on the question of the guilt or innocence of the accused until after you have reached a unanimous verdict.

Do not, and I say this again, do not write me a note saying the jury stands thus and so for guilty or acquittal. Because if you do, the chances are that will cause a mistrial and the case will have to be retried again. The only note that you should write to me on this subject is, if and when you reach a unanimous verdict, you write me a note saying we have reached a verdict. A unanimous verdict. You do not tell me what it is until you have arrived here in open Court and you are questioned about it.

and can't reach a verdict, which I hope will not be the case, somewhere after adequate deliberation on the question, you can write me a note asking to communicate that message to me in open Court, asking to see me in open Court. But, don't write me notes indicating how you stand numerically or otherwise during the course

of your deliberations for the reasons I have just

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indicated. Now if you retire briefly to the jury room I will discuss certain legal questions with counsel and I will recall you if there are any further

instructions that are necessary. The alternate will be discharged and you may begin. But not before then. Don't discuss the case.

(Jury excused.)

THE COURT: Either of you two gentlemen have anything you wish to add?

MR. CORCORAN: Your Honor, perhaps I must admit to a hearing problem. I thought your Honor said we were going to adjourn until 2:15.

THE COURT: No, I did not. Five past 2:00. wanted the jury to be here at five past 2:00.

MR. CORCORAN: It must be my hearing problem.

. THE COURT: It must be.

MR. JACKSON: For the record, I have a request to charge verbally on the buyer agent theory. As I understand the law that there is enough information or testimony that Mr. Hammonds was in fact the buyer and that Mr. Zeigler was his agent. That is my request to charge.

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THE COURT: Your request is denied.

MR. JACKSON: I have no ore requests.

MR. CORCORAN: I have no requests.

THE COURT: No other exceptions, Mr. Passalaqua?

MR. PASSALAQUA: No.

THE COURT: Bring the jury back.

(Jury enters jury box.)

THE COURT: Jurors, I'll ask you to step outside the room again, just for one moment. I must discuss something further with counsel. I'm sorry. Don't discuss the case.

(Jury excused.)

THE COURT: Juror Number 12 has just informed the clerk that his sister passed away today. If it goes beyond roughly 5:00 or 6:00 o'clock he will not be able to participate.

MR. JACKSON: All you can do is put in the

MR. PASSALAQUA: We have no objection.

Alternate Number 1?

THE COURT: The right thing to do is put in Alternate Number 1.

MR. JACKSON: That is the one sitting in front?

MR. PASSALAQUA: Yes, the young fellow.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

-against-

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE

CLIFFORD ZIEGLER,

Defendant-Appellant.

STATE OF NEW YORK) COUNTY OF NEW YORK) ss:

LESLEE NYMAN, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

that she is not a party to this action, is over 18 years of age and resides at New York, N. Y.; that on March 1, 1976, she served the annexed brief and appendix upon Hon. DAVID G. TRAGER, United States Attorney, Eastern District of New York, Attorney for Appellee, at 225 Cadman Plaza East Brooklyn, New York 11201, the address designated by said United States Attorney for that purpose by depositing true copies of same, enclosed in a postpaid, properly addressed wrapper, in an official depository under the exclusive care and custody of the United States Post Office within the State of New York.

Sworn to before me this 18th day of March, 1976

V/ILLIAM J. STUTMAN
NOTARY PUBLIC, State of New York
No. 31-9233920
Qualified in New York County
Commission Expires March 30, 1976